As we set out in the Preface to this report, Prevent is one strand in the government’s counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. The other strands being Protect, Prepare and Pursue. Pursue has some overlap with Prevent in the sense that it also has a ‘pre-crime’ element, one which is often conflated with Prevent. As we have seen, the failures in recent terrorist cases, whether in the Manchester Arena bombing, or in the stabbings at Fishmongers’ Hall, have been failures within Pursue with few implications for Prevent.

In this report, we have restricted ourselves to consider only Prevent. Its concerns lie much further back than Pursue – pre, pre-crime, as it were. It is our conclusion that it provides no additional value to counter-terrorism than is provided by the other three strands. It does, however, have damaging consequences for democracy and thereby contributes to the very risks it purports to mitigate.

Prevent is necessarily discriminatory. It represents a system of surveillance and pre-emptive intervention – a comprehensive

system of stop and search, albeit with no actual offence as its object, as we have seen – and this depends on profiling. Profiling occurs through the designation of Prevent Priority Areas, where the criteria that are used and even the areas themselves are not transparent. Nor are the Prevent Panels which exist in each local authority in England locally accountable. The operation of Prevent is not made subject to evaluation according to the Public Sector Equalities Duty, a duty which the government has treated as discretionary since 2012. This means that Prevent both reinforces and perpetuates a broader institutional Islamophobia, while at the same time being unaccountable for doing so.

The discriminatory nature of Prevent is intrinsic to it, at the same time as the Prevent Duty is unnecessary. We do accept that public authorities have a safeguarding duty, but it is one that can be carried out under the normal professional ethics of the respective practitioners. The additional behaviours that some are pressing to include within Prevent, for example, misogyny, antisemitism, bullying etc, can easily be accommodated within normal practices of schools and other services without them being regarded as issues of national security.

Covid-19 has had a major impact on young people. It has also come on the back of serious cuts to the funding of youth services and investment in young people.

Prevent has become a means of getting some mitigation of those cuts, but it comes at the cost of incorporating young people into a wider security apparatus. Our view is that all children and young people merit investment in their future as a public good outside the framing of national security.

We do not object to the teaching of values within schools. Indeed, under section 78 of the 2002 Education Act, schools are required to provide for the moral, spiritual and intellectual development of children and young people. This need not mean the teaching of fundamental British values (and, of course does not take that direct form in the devolved administrations). Instead, we understand it to mean the teaching of values fundamental to living together with difference.

We have already noted that the teaching of ‘fundamental British values’ as part of Prevent is made mandatory under section 78. This makes it a national curriculum (indeed, a nationalist curriculum), but it also subordinates the spiritual and moral development of children, and the religious and philosophic convictions of their parents, to a national security interest. This particular form of secular hostility – in co-opting safeguarding – determines what is in a child’s best interests according to a political agenda, rather than the child’s own wellbeing.

The Westminster government’s assertion of the ‘Britishness’ of the values is necessarily divisive. Most government policy documents are accompanied by the trumpeting of Britain as one of the ‘most successful multi-ethnic societies’ in the world. That claim is accompanied by a deep hostility to multi-culturalism and a wish for all minorities to pass their voice into that of a majority that insists on claiming its native right to define what is British and what is not.

It implies that the ‘majority’ thought of as ‘native British’ have a natural association to the values, whilst ‘minorities’, whether ethnic or religious, are understood potentially to exhibit a cultural deficit. The denial of difference is, in effect, an argument that ethnic and religious minorities must assimilate and their participation as citizens is under sufferance.

The Covid-19 pandemic has revealed a different Britain. It has shown that the key workers relied on to deliver the nation’s health and well-being – hospital workers, care workers, cleaners, shop workers and distribution workers – are disproportionately from migrant or ethnic minority backgrounds and disproportionately made up of the low paid (they have also been disproportionately likely to be its victims). It has not been a nation divided between ‘the people’ and ‘others’.

Rather there has been a demonstration that people with differences in thought and values can not only live together, but in a crisis, save the nation.

Terrorist outrages always elicit the response that the nation must come together and that the perpetrators must not be allowed to win against our values. We have conducted our review of Prevent in the light of these injunctions and we conclude that Prevent fails on each count.

What has been undermined is multi-cultural equality grounded in rights of citizenship and protections against arbitrary state action. The latter is no less arbitrary if it is by an elected government claiming a popular mandate (albeit in the UK it is one mediated by devolved assemblies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and in England operates on the basis of the delivery of parliamentary seats on a declining proportion of the vote).

The US political philosopher, Danielle Allen, has written powerfully of the danger of the intolerance of difference that lies within the idea of popular sovereignty, albeit that it is frequently represented as a democratic ideal (whether by the left or the right).220 The idea is incorporated in the US Declaration of Independence, and reproduced daily in US schools, in the ‘pledge of allegiance’ to “one nation indivisible with liberty and justice for all”.

What would happen, Allen asks, were we to propose, instead, an allegiance to the “whole nation indivisible”? The ‘whole nation’ would be understood as a nation of parts – that is, as differentiated – where an obligation towards indivisibility would be an obligation towards difference and its recognition.

A commitment to the whole nation would require an obligation toward multicultural equality. It is precisely that commitment that is under threat. This is a consequence of falsely proposing that the traditions of some members of our political community renders them inherently ‘risky’.

The outcome of this is an undermining of people’s rights, especially their rights to religious belief and expression, which is placed under suspicion by Prevent. A core question that arises is how muscular liberalism can be, if this denies one of its own claimed values of tolerance toward different religious beliefs? How muscular can liberalism be before it creates second-class citizenship for some and denies them full participation?

In this report we have shown that Prevent operates in a way that reinforces divided citizenship. It is the primary mechanism for communicating that understanding of ‘others’ (alongside, perhaps, the creation of a ‘hostile environment’ for migrants).

The conclusion we reach is a necessary one: Prevent must be withdrawn, for the sake of our children and young people and for the sake of our democracy. Its purpose is ‘ideological’ and its withdrawal would have no detrimental consequence for national security. In fact, its withdrawal will make it more likely that vitally important conversations will take place about the urgent need to challenge injustice and create a fair society for all.

We call on the government to withdraw its Prevent strategy on the grounds that it is ineffective, disproportionate and discriminatory.

We call on practitioners caught up in Prevent, community groups, trades unions and professional associations, and civil society groups to demand that Prevent be withdrawn.

Appendix 1: Summary of Cases

The cases presented in this report have been anonymised and are provided with the consent of those concerned. They are taken from 596 cases submitted to Prevent Watch between Oct 2014 to Dec 2021 as well as some submitted directly to the People’s Review of Prevent call for submissions. We have also reproduced additional cases from research reports such as Medact in their report ‘Racism, mental health and pre-crime policing: the ethics of Vulnerability Support Hubs’ and from the ‘Islam on Campus’ report by Professor Alison Scott-Baumann and her colleagues.

Three hundred of the cases provided to Prevent Watch involved children under the age of 18 with more than half of these being of primary school age or younger (i.e. under 11 years of age). The youngest of the children – one for whom a Prevent referral was made – was four years old. In one extraordinary case a Prevent officer and social worker sought to interview a mother who had not yet given birth because they feared her soon-to-be-born child was at risk of radicalisation by the absent father.

Almost all of the cases involving children also engaged children’s services. Almost half of these children had not been known to social services until they were referred under Prevent or referred to social services after a concern about ‘radicalisation’.

Over 100 of the cases indicated ‘increased religiosity’ as a major factor in the Prevent referral – either in the initial rationale for the referral, or in the subsequent questioning by Prevent officers. We have seen first-hand evidence from clients where increased religiosity was indicated as a factor on the vulnerability assessment frameworks used to consider suitability for referring to Channel.

In 78 of the cases, those involved reported feeling coerced into engaging with the Prevent programme.

All of the cases were from within England and Wales. Seventy percent of the total cases were from within Greater London with the remaining cases mainly spread across the North West of England and the East and West Midlands regions.

The most common source of a referral was from within the education sector.

The case archive includes 101 cases where the police had instigated the referral. The majority of these cases did not meet the threshold of any concern to warrant anything other than a voluntary intervention under a s17 assessment.

Appendix 2: Prevent Reports

The following reports formed part of our evidence base:

Institute of Education, University College London, (2021), Addressing Extremism through the Classroom: A Research Report from the Centre for Teachers and Teaching Research, https:// Classroom%20-%20Final%20Report.pdf

Muslim Engagement and Development, (2021), Stifling Dissent: Approaches to Pro-Palestinian Activism in Schools,[1]Palestinian-activism-in-schools.pdf

Medact, (2021), Racism, mental health & pre-crime policing: the ethics of Vulnerability Support Hubs, Dr. Hilary Aked, Dr. Tarek Younis, Dr. Charlotte Heath-Kelly, uploads/2021/05/Racism_mental_health_pre-crime_policing_Medact_Report_May_2021_ ONLINE.pdf

Medact, (2020), False Positives: the Prevent counter-extremis policy in healthcare, Dr. Hilary Aked,

Durham University, School of Oriental and African Studies, Coventry University and Lancaster University,(2020) Professor Mathew Guest, Professor Alison Scott-Baumann, Dr Sariya Cheruvallil[1]Contractor, Dr Shuruq Naguib, Dr Aisha Phoenix, Islam and Muslims on UK University Campuses: Perceptions and Challenges, file148310.pdf

Birmingham City University, (2020), A Disproportionate Response: Five Years of the Prevent Duty in Higher Education, Dr. Andrew Whiting, Dr. Keith Spiller, Professor Imran Awan, https://bcuassets.

Transnational Institute, (2019), : Ruth Blakeley, Ben Hayes, Nisha Kapoor, Arun Kundnani, Narzanin Massoumi, David Miller, Tom Mills, Rizwaan Sabir, Katy Sian and Waqas Tufail, Leaving the War on Terror: A Progressive Alternative to Counter-Terrorism Policy, files/publication-downloads/leaving_the_war_on_terror_online.pdf

University of Warwick: Department of Politics and International (2018), Dr. Charlotte Heath[1]Kelly, Erzsébet Strausz, Counter-terrorism in the NHS: Evaluating prevent duty safeguarding in the NHS, Studies, 6, soc/pais/research/researchcentres/irs/counter[1]terrorisminthenhs/project_ report_60pp.pdf

Transnational Institute, (2018), Arun Kundnani and Ben Hayes, The globalisation of Countering Violent Extremism policies Undermining human rights, instrumentalising civil society, https://www.

Cage, (2018), Dr. Asim Qureshi, Separating Families – How Prevent Seeks the Removal of Children,[1]report

Just Yorkshire, (2017), Dr. Waqas Tufail, Dr. Bano Murtuja, Rethinking Prevent: A case for an alternative approach

Runnymede Trust, (2017), Islamophobia: Still a challenge for us all, https://www.runnymedetrust. org/uploads/Islamophobia%20Report%202018%20FINAL.pdf

Cage, (2016), Dr. Asim Qureshi and Ben Hayes, We are completely independent: The Home Office, Breakthrough Media and the Prevent Counter Narrative Industry, we-are-completely-independent-report

Open Society Foundation, (2016), Amrit Singh, Eroding Trust The UK’s Prevent Counter-Extremism Strategy in Health and Education, 95a8-54ba85dce818/eroding-trust-20161017_0.pdf

Cage, (2016), The ‘science’ of pre-crime: The secret ‘radicalisation’ study underpinning Prevent

Rights and Security International, (2016), Adriana Edmeades, Preventing Education? Human Rights and UK Counter-Terrorism Policy in Schools, downloads/preventing-education-final-to-print-3.compressed-1_.pdf

Cage, (2015), Failing our communities: A case study approach to understanding, Prevent https://

Cage, (2014), Jahangir Mohammed, Dr. Adnan Siddiqui, The prevent strategy: a cradle to grave police-state,[1]to-Grave.pdf

Equality and Human Rights Commission, (2011), Dr. Tufyal Choudhury and Dr. Helen Fenwick. The impact of counter-terrorism measures on Muslim communities, https://www.equalityhumanrights. com/sites/default/files/research-report72-the-impact-of-counter-terrorism-measures-on[1]muslim-communities. pdf;


(1) See, Ministry of Justice (202021) Independent Human Rights Act Review. independent-human-rights-act-review.

(2) Medact, (2020), False Positives: the Prevent counter-extremism policy in healthcare. Author Dr. Hilary Aked.

(3) Department for Education, Explore Education Statistics.

(4) Pat Thomson (2020) School scandals: Blowing the whistle on the corruption of our education system (Policy Press).

(5) See, Department for Education (2019) Academy Trusts: governance.

(6) See, Home Office (2011) Counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST).

(7) See, Terrorism Act 2000: s. 1, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019: s. 1-3.

(8) See, Home Office (annually) Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme statistics.

(9) The phrase is from Kawtar Najib (2021) Spatialized Islamophobia (Routledge).

(10) In a response (Ref 6293, dated 21st December 2021), to a Freedom of Information request from Children’s Rights International, the Home Office declared, “The Home Office holds partial data on the ethnicity and religion of those referred to Prevent that were deemed suitable for the Channel Programme and therefore were discussed at a Channel Panel. However, it was decided that this information was exempt from disclosure under section 24(1) of the FOI Act. The balance of the public interest was considered to fall in favour of non-disclosure”.

(11) See, Office for Students (2021) Prevent Monitoring: Summary of annual accountability and data returns: 2017-18, 2018-19, 2019-20. Page 4.

(12) See, National Security Service, MI5 (2021). Northern Ireland.

(13) Home Office (2011) Prevent Strategy. Available at:, page 1.

(14) Home Office (2015) Prevent duty Guidance.

(15) See, Prevent Duty Guidance, Glossary of Terms.

(16) Prevent Strategy 2011, op cit, page 108.

(17) Department for Education (2014) Guidance, Promoting fundamental British values through SMSC.

(18) The information in this box is drawn from, John Holmwood and Therese O’Toole (2018) Countering Extremism in British Schools? The Truth about the Birmingham Trojan Horse Affair (Policy Press).

(19) Home Office (2015) Counter Extremism Strategy., paragraph 22.

(20) See, Paul Thomas, ‘British Muslims. A suspect community?, Chapter 4, Responding to the Threat of Violent Extremism Failing to Prevent (Bloomsbury Academic, 2017, Open Access).

(21) Department for Education (2020) Guidance. Plan your relationships, sex and health curriculum. For discussion, see, John Holmwood (2020). ‘Ratcheting up the Prevent agenda in schools’ Discover Society, November.

(22) Conservative and Unionist Party (2017) Forward Together: Our Plan for a Stronger Britain and a Prosperous Future, page 55. Available at

(23) See, Lucia Zedner and Andrew Ashworth (2019) ‘The rise and restraint of the Preventive State’, Annual Review of Criminology. 2:429-50; Tarek Younis (2020) ‘The psychologization of counter-extremism: unpacking PREVENT’, Race and Class. 62(3): 37-60.

(24) Charlotte Heath-Kelly (2013) ‘Counter-Terrorism and the Counterfactual: Producing the ‘Radicalisation’ Discourse and the UK PREVENT Strategy’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations. 15(3):394-415.

(25) Arun Kundnani (2015). A Decade Lost: Rethinking Radicalisation and Extremism. London: Claystone. The police provides an online mechanism for reporting through the website Act Early.

(26) Sara Khan (2019) Challenging Hateful Extremism: Summary Version, page 9.

(27) Dr Katherine E Brown, Professor Fiona de Londras and Jessica White Embedding Human Rights in Countering Extremism: Reflections from the Field and Proposals for Change.

(28) Matt Dathan, November 01, 2021, The Times, ‘Priti Patel shuts down scheme hailed for extremism work’.

(29) See, Cabinet Office February 01, 2022.

(30) See, his evidence to the House of Commons House of Lords Joint Committee on Human Rights Legislative Scrutiny:Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill Ninth Report of Session 2017–19.

(31)  Counter Terrorism and Border Security Act, 2019.

(32)  See, John Holmwood and Therese O’Toole (2019) ‘Focus: an independent review of the Prevent strategy’, Discover Society, September.

(33)  Jamie Grierson and Vikram Dodd, January 22 2019, The Guardian, ‘Prevent strategy on radicalisation faces independent review’.

(34)  Alison Scott-Baumann and Simon Perfect (2021) Freedom of Speech in Universities: Islam, Charities and Counter-Terrorism, London: Routledge.

(35)  Richard McNeil-Willson, Rob Faure Walker and Isobel Ingham-Barrow (2021) The Henry Jackson Society: The Threat to British Democracy caused by Security Think Tanks.

(36)  Spin Watch (2015) The Henry Jackson Society and the Degeneration of British Neo-Conservatism: Libeeral Interventionism, Islamophobia and the War on Terror.

(37)  See, for example, Rupert Sutton (2015) Preventing Prevent? Challenges to Counter-Radicalisaton Policy On Campus. Henry Jackson Society.

(38)   Khadijah Elshayyal, ‘Securitisation, fundamental British values and the neutralisation of dissent within Muslim discourses in the UK’. Maydan, February 26, 2020.

(39)  John Holmwood ‘Ratcheting up the Prevent agenda’, op cit.

(40)  Justice (2021) Police, Crime and sentencing Bill.

(41)   Liberty, 16 Feb 2021. ‘Rights groups boycott Prevent Review’.

(42)  Grierson, J. (March 2021) ‘Hundreds of Islamic groups boycott Prevent review over choice of chair’ (The Guardian)

(43)  United Nations, April 2021. Statement. UN Experts Condemn UK Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities Report.

(44)  Aubrey Allegretti, 22 April 2021. The Guardian, ‘Equality watchdog raised concerns about UK racereport, documents show’.

(46)  John Denham (2001) Building Cohesive Communities: A Report on the Ministerial Group on Public Order and Community Cohesion. Home Office. Cohesive%20Communities%20(The%20Denham%20Report)%202001.pdf; Ted Cantle (2001)Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team. Home Office. For a recent discussion, see, Mike Maikin-White (2021) On Burnley Road: Class, Race and Politics in a Northern English Town (Lawrence andWishart).

(47)  Gemma Catney, G. (2015) ‘Has neighbourhood ethnic residential segregation decreased? Ethnic identity and inequalities in Britain’, Dynamics of Diversity: 109–22.

(48)  William Shankley, Tina Hannemann and Ludi Simpson (2021) ‘The demography of ethnic minorities in Britain’ in Bridget Byrne, Claire Alexander, Omar Khan, James Nazroo and William Shankley (eds) (2021) Ethnicity, Race and Inequality in the UK: State of the Nation (Policy Press).

(49)  Runnymede Trust (2000) Parekh Report. Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain.

(50)  Department for Schools, Children and the Family (2007) ‘Guidance on the duty to promote community cohesion’, London.

(51)  ibid, page 4

(52)  Therese O’Toole, Nassar Meer, Daniel Nilsson DeHanas, Stephen H. Jones, and Tariq Modood, (2016)‘Governing through Prevent? Regulation and contested practice in state-Muslim engagement’, Sociology, 50(1): 160–177.

(53)  Kundani, A. (2009) ‘Spooked: how not to prevent violent extremism. (pp.35; 40) See, Khadijah

(54)  Elshayyal, ‘Securitisation, fundamental British values and the neutralisation of dissent within

(55)   Muslim discourses in the UK’. Maydan, February 26, 2020. Available at: Page 1

(56)  Narzanin Massoumi (2021) ‘The role of civil Society in political repression: the UK Prevent counter-terrorism programme’, Sociology, Online first.

(57)  Muslim Council of Britain (2021) Defining Islamophobia: A Contemporary Understanding of How Expressions  of  Muslimness  are  Targeted.

(58)   Peter Hopkins (2021) Report of the Inquiry into Islamophobia in Scotland by the Cross-Party Group on Tackling Islamophobia: Scotland’s Islamophobia.

(59)  See the various reports by the Centre for Student Rights at the Henry Jackson Society. See also, Hannah Stuart, H. (2017) Islamist Terrorism: Analysis of Offences and Attacks in the UK (1998-2015).

For criticism, see, Perfect, S. and Scott-Baumann, A. (2019) ‘A critical analysis of the Henry Jackson Society’s report Extreme Speakers and Events: In the 2017/18 Academic Year’, SOAS.

(60)  See, the Policy Exchange History Matters webpages.

(61)  See, for example, Remi Adekoya, Eric Kaufmann, and Thomas Simpson (2020) Academic freedom in the UK Protecting viewpoint diversity. Policy Exchange.

(62)  David Cameron (2011) PM’s Speech at Munich Security Conference.

(63)  Dame Louise Casey (2016) The Casey Review: a review into opportunity and integration. An independent report for the Department of Communities and Local Government.; Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (2018) Integrated Communities Strategy: summary of consultation responses and government response. For criticisms of the Integrated Strategies Green Paper, see: John Holmwood, Gurminder K. Bhambra and Sue Scott (eds) Integrated Communities: A Response to the Government’s Strategy Green Paper. Discover Society. MEND (2018) Submission from Muslim Engagement and Development (MEND) to the consultation on the “Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper; Building Stronger, More United Communities”.

(64)  Saffron Karlsen and James Y. Nazroo (2015) ‘Ethnic and religious differences in the attitudes of people towards being “British”’, Sociological Review, 63(4)

(65)  Ibid, page 774

(66)  A. Guveli and L. Platt (2011) ‘Understanding the religious behaviour of Muslims in the Netherlands and the UK’, Sociology, 45: 1008–1027; N. Foner and R. Alba (2008) ‘Immigrant religion in the US and Western Europe: bridge or barrier to inclusion?’, International Migration Review, 42: 360–392; A. Manning and S.Roy (2010) ‘Culture clash or culture club? National identity in Britain’,The Economics Journal, 120(542):F72–F100.39.

(67)  Varun Uberoi and Tariq Modood (2013) ‘Inclusive Britishness: a multiculturalist advance’, Political Studies, 61: 23–41.

(68)  H. Jayaweera and T. Choudhury (2008) ‘Immigration, faith and cohesion: evidence from local areas with significant Muslim populations’, York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Available at:

(69)  Yasmin Hussain and Paul Bagguley (2005) ‘Citizenship, ethnicity and identity: British Pakistanis after the 2001 “Riots”’, Sociology, 39: 407–425.

(70)  Paul Thomas, (2010) ‘Failed and Friendless: The UK’s ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ Programme’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations. 12(3):442-458.

(71)  MPs on the Education Committee (2021). ‘How white working-class pupils have been let down and how to change it’.

(72)  This concern was first set out by the Runnymede Trust. See, Kjartan Sveinsson (ed) (2009) Who Cares about the White Working-Class.

(73)  Oxfam (2014) ‘A tale of two Britains: inequality in the UK’.

It has been exacerbated by the Covid-19 epidemic. See, Michael Marmot, Jessica Allen, Peter Goldblatt,Eleanor Herd, Joana Morrison (2021) Build Back Fairer: The COVID-19 Marmot Review.

(74)  Paul Thomas, et al (2015) ‘Understanding Concerns about Community Relations, Identity Papers: A journal of British and Irish studies 1(1).

(75)  Amanda Spielman (2018) ‘Speech at the Church of England Foundation for Educational Leadership’, 1 February. Available at:

(76)  Suraj Lakhani and Natalie James (2021) ‘“Prevent duty”: empirical reflections on the challenges of addressing far-right extremism within secondary schools and colleges in the UK’, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 14(1): 67-89.

(77)  Ibid, page 74

(78)  Stephen H. Jones and Amy Unsworth (2022) The Dinner Table Prejudice: Islamophobia in Contemporary Britain.

(79)  Ibid, page 8.

(80)  Robin Simcox, September 2, 2019, ‘Six policies for Boris to strengthen UK counter-terrorism. Heritage Foundation

(81)   Robin Simcox, March 29, 2021. ‘To combat far right, government must first understand how it ticks’. The Telegraph.

(82)  Prevent Strategy 2011, op cit page 108.

(83)  M. Berger, Extremism (MIT Press, 2018). Page 174

(84)  Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill.

(85) David Isaac. July 05 2019. ‘Freedom of speech in education: the foundation of an effective society’.

(86) Equality and Human Rights Commission website.

(87) Open letter. 10 July 2015. ‘PREVENT will have a chilling effect on open debate, free speech and political dissent’. The Independent.

(88) Home  Office  (2011)  Prevent  Strategy., page 1.

(89) Elshayyal op cit.

(90) Massoumi op cit.

(91) Charles H. Cho, Martin L. Martens, Kakkyun Kim, Michelle Rodrigue, Michelle (2011). ‘Astroturfing Global Warming: It Isn’t Always Greener on the Other Side of the Fence, Journal of Business Ethics. 104 (4):571–587.

(92) Home Office (2015) Counter Extremism Strategy., page 13.

(93)  See, House of Commons Library (2019) Voter ID: Securing the ballot or suppressing the vote.

(94)  Commission for Countering Extremism (2019) Challenging Hateful Extremism., Page 19.

(95)  Emma Fox (2018) ‘Profiting from Prejudice: How Mend’s ‘IAM’ Campaign Legitimised Extremism’.

(96)  Boris Johnson (2021) ‘PM remarks – Summit for Democracy’, 9 December.

(97)  J.S. Mill (1991 [1859]) On Liberty, edited by John Gray and G.W. Smith (Routledge). See also, Chapter 1 in Alison Scott-Baumann and Simon Perfect (2021) Freedom of Speech in Universities: Islam, Charities and Counter-Terrorism, (Routledge).

(98)  Mill op cit, page 65.

(99)  Alison Scott-Baumann, Mathew Guest, Shuruq Naguib, Sariya Cheruvallil-Contractor, and Aisha Phoenix(2020) Islam on campus: contested identities and the cultures of higher education in Britain (Oxford University Press), page 202.

(100) Mathew Guest, Alison Scott-Baumann, Sariya Cheruvallil-Contractor, Shuruq Naguib, Aisha Phoenix, Yenn Lee and Tarek Al-Baghal (2021) Islam and Muslims on UK University Campuses: Perceptions and challenges, See also Scott-Baumann et al, op cit.

(101)  Will Baldet October 28 2020, CapX. ‘Why have we let Islamist agitators dominate the counter-terrorism discourse?

(102) Muslim Council of Britain (2021) British Media’s Coverage of Muslims and Islam, 2018-2020. Centre for Media Monitoring.

(103)  Crest Advisory (2020) Listening to British Muslims: policing, extremism and Prevent.

(104) Op cit.

(105) See, for example, Charles Hymass, October 18 2021. The Telegraph. ‘Deradicalise extremists over three years instead of one, review to say: Prevent programme is “broken” and requires a major overhaul, report will say in wake of Sir David Amess’s death.

Charles Hymass, October 20 2021. The Telegraph. ‘Prevent is failing to target Islamist extremists, report warns: “Fundamental mismatch” between scale of Islamist threat and attention paid to it by counter-terrorism programme’.

(106)  Alison Scott-Baumann (2017) ‘Ideology, utopia and Islam on campus: How to free speech a little from its own terrors’, Education, Citizenship and Social Justice. 12(2) 159–176.

(107) The CREST advisory report laid some store by the government’s actions on ‘anti-Muslim hatred’, citing across departmental group representing different departments and involving external advisers. We have been unable to find any publicly available reports by this group.

(108)  Paul Thomas, (2014). ‘Divorced but still co-habiting? Britain’s Prevent/community cohesion policy tension.’ British Politics 9(4): 21.

(109) See,

(110)  Asim Qureshi, (2016). ‘The “science” of pre-crime: The secret “radicalisation” study underpinning PREVENT.’

(111)  See, the Home Office (2016) Prevent Duty: catalogue of training courses. Prevent Duty: catalogue of training courses.

(112)  Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements were put in place in 2000 to deal with risks associated with released violent and/ or sexual offenders. They were extended to cover released terrorist offenders in 2009. See Disley, Emma; Mafalda Pardal; Kristin Weed & Anais Reding (2016) Using Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements to manage and supervise terrorist offenders: Findings from an exploratory study, RAND Corporation Report RR-441-RE. Available from The Police Crime and Sentencing and Courts Bill 2021 introduces a new category of ‘non-terrorist offenders’ deemed to be at risk of ‘radicalisation’. This blurs the line with the ‘pre-crime’ space since it can involve serious restrictions on civil liberties based upon a suspicion of a future crime unrelated to the original offence for which an individual was punished.

(113) See, BBC News, November 24, 2021. ‘Manchester Arena Inquiry: Mosque failed to act on extremism, families say’.

(114) See,  Manchester  Arena  Inquiry,  Day  168.

(115) See for example, Dr Paul Stott, October 19 2021, Policy Exchange. ‘Fourteen questions for ministers and police emerging from the killing of Sir David Amess MP’. ‘;  See also, the webinar organised by the Henry Jackson Society on ‘Victims and Survivors of Terror: Perspectives on Prevention and Beyond’ in February 2021.

(116) The most egregious perhaps is associated with the appointment of Robin Simcox as Interim Commissioner for Countering Extremism. He had previously founded a new consultancy, the Counter Extremism Group, with former member of Policy Exchange on secondment as Head of Research at the Commission for Countering Extremism, Hannah Stuart. Lord Carlile has recently joined the group. See,

(117) Michael Jones (2020). Assessing communications-based activities to prevent and counter violent extremism,  Royal United Services  Institute (RUSI).

(118) Home Office, 7 April 2021. New Director General for Homeland Security announced.

(119) See, for example, Act Early (no date) Signs of radicalisation- what to look for.

(120) Home Office, 5 November 2019. Factsheet: Prevent and Channel.

(121) For example, Tim Squirrel of the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (a London-based extremism thinktank) was reported in the Guardian commenting that, “we need to recognise that many people, particularly young men, who essentially need some combination of social services, mental health support and other kinds of non-securitised intervention are instead being caught up by counter-terrorism programmes.” Ben Quinn, Jan 3, 2022. ‘Glorification of Plymouth shooter by ‘incels’ prompts calls for action’, TheGuardian.

(122) Madeleine-Sophie Abbas (2021) Terror and the Dynamism of Islamophobia in 21st Century Britain (Palgrave)

(123) See, Lucia Zedner and Andrew Ashworth op cit; Tarek Younis op cit.

(124) Revised Prevent Duty Guidance, April 2021.

(125)  Although the school leaving age was raised to 18 in England in 2013, after which young people over the age of 16 were required to be in education or some form of training, the government routinely estimates young people over the age of 16 not in education, employment of training (NEETS). This reflects the fact that young people cannot guarantee progression from school to a sixth-form college or other place of training and there is no local monitoring of attendance since many educational establishments are outside local authority responsibility as a consequence of the academies programme. Of course, only about half of the age cohort go on to higher education, where the Prevent duty applies. As provided by the Home Office, January 2022, in response to a Freedom of Information Request.

(126) Op cit, page 108

(127) See, BBC News, November 24, 2021. ‘Manchester Arena Inquiry: Mosque failed to act on extremism, families say’.

(128) See, Asim Qureshi op cit.

(129) Monica Lloyd and Christopher Dean (2015) The Development of Structured Guidelines for Assessing Risk in Extremist Offenders, Journal of Threat Assessment and Management, 2(1). Page 48.

(130) UN Human Rights Council (2020) Human rights impact of policies and practices aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism. Para 16. https://digitallibrary.


(132) Op cit, para 17.

(133)  As Charlotte Heath-Kelley argues, the tool is a ‘psycho-behavioural’ identification of symptoms, with the idea of an intervention implying an orientation to returning the individual to ‘health’. See, Charlotte Heath-Kelly (2017) ‘The geography of pre-criminal space: epidemiological imaginations of radicalisation risk in the UK Prevent Strategy, 2007–2017’, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 10(2):297-319.

(134) “For the research reliability, two experienced researchers rated 50 randomly selected convicted extremist cases using the ERG22+. For the field reliability, 33 trained practitioners rated two test cases specifically developed for the study against ‘gold standard’ ratings.” See,

(135)  See, National Police Chiefs Council, March 20 2018. ‘ACSO Neil Basu launches new campaign about terrorist attack planning’.

(136)  House of Commons Library, October 14, 2021. Terrorism in Great Britain: the Statistics.

(137) For discussion see the essays in Mark Halstead and Monica J Taylor (eds) (1995) Values in Education and Education in Values, (Taylor and Francis).

(138) Monica Lloyd (2019) Extremism Risk Assessment: A Directory. Para 1.10.

(139) See, Charles Hymass, October 20 2021. The Telegraph. ‘Prevent is failing to target Islamist extremists, report  warns: “Fundamental mismatch” between scale of Islamist threat and attention paid to it by counter-terrorism programme’. news/2021/10/20/prevent-failing-target-islamist-extremists-report-warns/.

(140) The guidelines were for the teaching of sex and relationships education, but they went beyond that domain to provide generic advice. See, Department for Education, September 24, 2020. Guidance: Plan your relationships, sex and health curriculum.

(141)Hansard, January 19th 2022.

(142) Joel Busher, Tufyal Choudhury and Paul Thomas (2019) ‘The enactment of the counter-terrorism ‘Prevent duty’ in British schools and colleges: Beyond reluctant accommodation or straightforward policy acceptance’, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 12:3, 440-46.

(143)Department of Health (2011) ‘Building Partnerships, Staying Safe’. (NHS) https://assets.

(144)Department of Health (2009) Safeguarding Adults Report on the consultation on the review of ‘No Secrets’.

(145) HM Government (2018) Working Together to Safeguard Children Statutory framework: legislation relevant to safeguarding and promoting the welfare of children.

(146) Medact, False Positives, op cit.

(147) Nathan Hughes (2011) ‘Young people “as risk” or young people “at risk”; comparing discourses of anti-social behaviour in England and Victoria, Critical Social Policy. 31: 388-409.

(148) Jo Finch and David McKendrick (2019) ‘Securitising social work: Counter terrorism, extremism, and radicalisation’, in Stephen A. Webb (ed) The Routledge Handbook of Critical Social Work, (Routledge).

(149) Joel Busher, Tufyal Choudhury, Paul Thomas, and Gareth Harris (2017) What the Prevent duty means for schools and colleges in England: An analysis of educationalists’ experiences. Research Report. Aziz Foundation.

(150) Royal College of Psychiatrists (2016) Counter-terrorism and psychiatry Position Statement PS04/16., page 6

(151) Ibid, page 5

(152)  See Royal College of Psychiatrists, September 2016, Counter-terrorism and psychiatry Position Statement PS04/16, page 4,; and supplement, November 2017, Ethical considerations arising from the government’s counterterrorism strategy Supplement to: Counter-terrorism and psychiatry Position Statement PS04/16S, paragraph 6,

(153)  See, Pro Bono Economics (2021) A decade of change for children’s services funding.; Action   for   Children (2020)  Children’s  services  funding  and  spending.

(154)  HM Government (2020) Channel Duty Guidance: Protecting people vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. Paragraph 11

(155) Medact False Positives, op cit.

(156)  Home Office Statistics. Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme.

(157)  Medact (2021) Racism, mental health, and pre-crime policing: the ethics of Vulnerability Support Hubs.

(158)  Channel Duty Guidance, op cit, paragraph 12. In either case the assessment is carried out by the police.

(159)  Hannah  Stuart  (2020)  Counter-Terrorism  and  Extremism  in  Great Britain  Since  7/7.

(160) Ibid, page 10.

(161)  Rob Faure Walker (2021) The Emergence of ‘Extremism’: Exposing the Violent Discourse and Language of ‘Radicalization’, (Bloomsbury), page 155.

(162) Data Protection Act (2018).

(163) Counter Terrorism and Security Act (2015).

(164)  Based on information revealed in High Court case: RII vs Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis.

(165)  James Grierson, December 19 2019. The Guardian. ‘Family wins fight to delete child from Met’santi-radicalisation records’

(166)  College of Policing (no date) Information management: Retention, review and disposal.

(167) Ibid, section 2.4

(168)  Neutral  Citation  Number:  [2020]  EWHC  2528  (Admin).

(169) Para 59

(170) Para 75(i)

(171)  Jamie Grierson, July 19 2020. The Guardian. ‘Manchester colleges agreed to share data of students referred to counter-terror scheme’.

(172) See, Medact False Positives, op cit.

(173)  At the time of the last census (2011), 21% of the population of England and Wales was under the age of 18. HM Government, Ethnicity facts and figures, 17 August 2020,

(174)   Human Rights Act, Schedule 1, Article 14; Equality Act 2010; Convention on the Rights of the Child,Article 2; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 26.

(175)  UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, List of issues prior to submission of the combined sixth and seventh periodic reports of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, CRC/C/GBR/QPR/6-7, 4 March 2021, para. 13,

(176) Reporting period: March 2014 to March 2016. Information obtained under the Freedom of Information Act.

(177) Data provided following a freedom of information (FOI) request submitted by Child Rights International Network (CRIN). The Home Office declined to provide the same data following an FOI request submitted in 2021.

(178)  Human Rights Act 1998, Schedule 1, Article 10; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 13; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 19.

(179)  Human  Rights  Act  1998,  Schedule  1,  Article  9;  Convention  on the  Rights  of  the  Child,  Article  14; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 18.

(180) Committee on the Rights of the Child, List of issues prior to submission of the combined sixth and seventh review of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, CRC/C/GBR/QPR/607, 4 March 2021, para. 17(b).

(181)  Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 3(1).

(182)  UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 14 (2013) on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration (art. 3, para. 1), CRC/C/GC/14, 29 May2013, para. 6,

(183)  Convention on the Rights of the Child, paragraphs 6a, 6b and 6c.

(184)  Diane Taylor, January 26 2022. The Guardian, Anger over referral vulnerable boy, 11, to counter-radicalisation  scheme.

(185)  Convention on the Rights of the Child, Articles 3 and 40; Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 24 (2019) on children’s rights in the child justice system, CRC/C/GC/24, para. 2,

(186) Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 12.

(187) Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 5.

(188)  Equalities and Human Rights Commission (No Date) Human Rights Act, Article 8.

(189)  Equalities and Human Rights Commission (No Date) Human Rights Act, Article 9.

(190) United Nations (2016) Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Concluding observations on the twenty-first to twenty-third periodic reports of United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

(191)  UN Human Rights Council (2017) Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association on his follow-up mission to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

(192)  UN Human Rights Council (2020) Human rights impact of policies and practices aimed at preventingand countering violent extremism Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protectionof human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism. Para 16.

(193) See Box 22 below.

(194)  United Nations (2018) End of Mission Statement of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance at the Conclusion of Her Mission tothe United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Paragraph 45.

(195)  See for example, Commission for Countering Extremism (2021) Hateful Extremism and the Law An academic review. Authors Professor David Denney, Jeffrey DeMarco and Lana MacNaboe.

(196)  See, End of Mission Statement of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, op cit, paragraphs 12 and 13.

(197)  See, Aamna Mohdin, Peter Walker and Nazia Parveen, March 31 2021. The Guardian, No 10’s race report widely condemned as ‘divisive’.,

(198) Reference

(199)  See, End of Mission Statement of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, op cit, paragraph 45

(200) John Holmwood and Peter Oborne, July 24 2020. Middle East Eye, ‘Trojan Horse, Prevent, Islamophobia:How the EHRC failed British Muslims’.

(201) Reference

(202) EHRC. Our plans for 2019-2022.


(204), section 3.4

(205) Ref


(207)  Joint statement from the UK NHRIs to the Human Rights Council in response to the report from the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance on the UK – titled ‘UK NHRIs Response to SR Racism Report on the UK’

(208) David Anderson, QC (2013) ‘The meaning of terrorism’. Clifford Chance/ University of Essex Lecture 13.

(209) Paragraph 54

(210) Conor Gearty (2013) Liberty and Security (Polity)

(211)  Foreign & Commonwealth Office. 2018. UK-India working together to counter extremism.

(212)  Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office. 2017. ‘Countering the root causes of violent extremism undermining growth and stability in China’s Xinjiang Region by sharing UK best practice.’

(213)  Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination reviews the report of China.; See also Akshaya Kumar,November 15 2018. ‘Glaring Omission in Security Council Plan to Visit China:One Million Uighurs in Detention Deserve World’s Attention’. Human Rights Watch.

(214) See,

(215)  Raffaello Pantucci, July 9 201. South China Morning Post. ‘Why China must do more to fight international terrorism’.





(220) D.S. Allen (2004) ‘Invisible citizens: on exclusion and domination in Ralph Ellison and Hannah Arendt’, in M. Williams and S. Macedo (eds) Nomos XLVI: Political Exclusion and Domination, New York: NYU Press.